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Non technical summary: 
In Latin American countries, political instability is not uncommon: in particular, the transfer of power is not 
always subject to normal terms of election. In these circumstances, market expectations must not only take 
into account the commitment of the present government, but also incorporate future decisions of its potential 
successor. This could increase country risk even when the incumbent government is fully committed to a 
pegged exchange rate, particularly if the successor government is known to be considering devaluation and 
strategic default. 
 
We develop a model suitable for situations of political instability and substantial dollarisation --- both 
pervasive factors in emerging markets. The former has been studied by Alesina et al. (1996), who define 
political instability as the tendency of a government to collapse (Using a sample of 113 countries for the 
period 1950 through 1982 they find that in periods of such instability growth is significantly lower than 
otherwise.); and Annett (2001) has shown how political instability in emerging markets is linked to racial and 
religion divisions. ``Dollarization, defined as the holding by residents of foreign currency and foreign 
currency-denominated deposits at domestic banks'' has been at the centre of the debate on ``original sin'' 
(Eichengreen & Hausmann 1999). Dollarisation may appear an attractive monetary regime for checking 
inflation, but if a country has an exchange rate misalignment, the possibility of a financial crisis becomes an 
issue (Calvo, 2002). 
 
In the present model it is assumed that the country under analysis has two possible governments with different 
ideologies and policy preferences: the existing government, who is fully committed to maintaining the peg, 
and the successor government which has a low cost of switching to float. Market expectations of a change of 
government can undermine the effectiveness of the most committed policy-maker: and sovereign spreads can 
rise even when a currency board is fully supported by the current administration. This paper provides an 
explicit pricing of such risk when political instability is given exogenously.  
 
The Argentinean crisis is used to illustrate the argument. Argentina had a fixed exchange regime and the 
contractual structure was very much dollarised (Galiani, Heymann & Tommasi 2002), with 2/3 of commercial 
debt in dollars (IADB, 2004) (Calvo, Izquierdo & Talvi 2003). This left Argentina very vulnerable to a sudden 
stop. Argentina in 2001 was in a fixed exchange rate regime with a completely committed and fully credible 
policy-maker to maintain it: Mr Cavallo. Nevertheless, during 2001 the country suffered high country risk and 
a deep financial crisis, see Figure 1. Hence the issue: why high country risk, even if the current government 
was fully committed to maintain the peg? 
 
The confused nature of the transfer of power in the Argentine case is underlined by the fact that there were 5 
presidents in 10 days: and that President Duhalde was only regarded as a care-taker, precluded from running 
for office when the next round of elections were held in 2003 (Bruno, 2004). Lack of political legitimacy, 
coming after capital flight had stripped off the central bank of its dollar reserves, could help to explain the 
chaotic end to convertibility. These could prove interesting extensions to the political economy approach 
adopted here. 
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1 Introduction
In Latin American countries, political instability is not uncommon: in particular, the
transfer of power is not always subject to normal terms of election. In these circum-
stances, market expectations must not only take into account the commitment of the
present government, but also incorporate future decisions of its potential successor.
This could increase country risk even when the incumbent government is fully com-
mitted to a pegged exchange rate, particulary if the successor government is known
to be considering devaluation and strategic default.
We develop a model suitable for situations of political instability and substantial
dollarisation — both pervasive factors in emerging markets. The former has been
studied by Alesina, Ozler, Roubini & Swage (1996), who define political instability
as the tendency of a government to collapse1; and Annet (2001) who has shown how
political instability in emerging markets is linked to racial and religion divisions.
“Dollarization, defined as the holding by residents of foreign currency and foreign
currency-denominated deposits at domestic banks” has been at the centre of the
debate on “original sin” (Eichengreen & Hausmann 1999). Dollarisation may appear
an attractive monetary regime for checking inflation, but if a country has an exchange
rate misalignment, the possibility of a financial crisis becomes an issue (Calvo 2002).
In the present model it is assumed that the country under analysis has two possible
governments with different ideologies and policy preferences: the existing government,
who is fully committed to maintaining the peg, and the successor government which
has a low cost of switching to float. Despite the fact that initially the country has
a currency peg with a fully committed government, the opposition evaluates the
optimal timing of leaving the fixed regime, should it take power, and chooses an
optimal devaluation trigger that is public information. Moreover, we assume that
the change of government follows a Poisson distribution whose frequency reflects the
country’s level of institutional instability. Market expectations of both devaluation
and default in the second government could lead to high interest rates as investors
seek ex-ante compensation. We assume that the only way to abandon the peg is by
1Using a sample of 113 countries for the period 1950 through 1982 they find that in periods of
such instability growth is significantly lower than otherwise.
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devaluing and pesifing (de-dollarising) as a number of observers suggested (Hausmann
2001, Krugman 2001 and Miller 2001), otherwise the large foreign currency debt will
destabilise the whole economy.
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Figure 1: Country risk and GDP
The Argentinean crisis is used to illustrate the argument. Argentina had a fixed
exchange regime and the contractual structure was very much dollarised (Galiani,
Heymann & Tommasi 2002), with 2/3 of commercial debt in dollars (IADB 2004)
(Calvo, Izquierdo & Talvi 2003). This left Argentina very vulnerable to a sudden
stop. Argentina in 2001 was in a fixed exchange rate regime with a completely
committed and fully credible policy-maker to maintain it: Mr Cavallo. Nevertheless,
during 2001 the country suffered high country risk and a deep financial crisis, see
Figure 1. Hence the issue: why high country risk, even if the current government was
fully committed to maintain the peg?
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The paper is organised in three sections. The following section (Section 2) de-
scribes the proposed model. The next section depicts the behaviour of the optimising
policy-maker under the successor government and its consequent country risk pre-
mium. Section 4 reports in which way this premium increases ex ante country risk
under the first government through the expected (random) switch of government.
Finally, in the last section we draw some conclusions.
2 The Model
Following Ozkan & Sutherland (1998) we assume that output is determined by global
demand conditions, interest rates and the exchange rate. To tailor their model to fit
the description of devaluation and default in a highly dollarised economy, we assume
that all debts were contracted in US dollars, and all these debts would be pesified
after devaluation and default.
Specifically, output is determined as follows:
yt = αpi + xt − γs (1)
where yt is the output gap (supply minus demand) measured as percentage of GDP,
pi is the price discount associated with external debt (the country risk), xt is the
global fundamentals (e.g., global slowdown in demand), s is the price of a dollar, all
in logs except pi. Initially, with one peso to the dollar, s is equal to zero. Output is
normalised so that, if there are no country risk (pit = 0)and external shocks (xt = 0),
there will be no output gap at the pegged exchange rate, i.e., demand will match
supply.
Let the discount of local dollar debt relative to US equivalent be a proxy for the
country risk:2
pi = c/r − v (2)
2In the case of partial default, v = c/r′ < c/r, where r′ (r′ > r) is the effective interest rate in
the market when default is anticipated. The country risk is normally defined as ∆r ≡ r′ − r, and
this paper use c/r − v = ∆r/(∆r + r), a monotonic transformation of the country risk.
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where c is the coupon (measured in $US) on the unit debt, r is the US interest rate
(and so c/r measures the par value of the long maturity debt). The average price of
debt is given by v = V/D with D being the fixed amount of the country’s debt in
dollars and V its value. If the coupon payments of c are expected to be honoured
at all times, then with foreign rates constant, the debt price will stand at par (i.e.,
v = c/r); but anticipated reduction of coupon payments (through debt restructuring
or default) will lower bond values below par and lead to a country risk premium which
affects GNP as bond values are reflected in domestic interest rates.
It is assumed that the country is initially on a fixed exchange rate (where s is
normalised to zero). The key exogenous factor driving output is ‘global fundamentals’
as measured by the variable xt, assumed to follow a Brownian motion:
dxt = σdZt (3)
where Zt is a standard Brownian motion and σ is the instantaneous standard devia-
tion. This variable includes effects of world business cycle and the competitive pres-
sures exerted by trade partners: in the Argentinean case, for example, the country
was subject to substantial negative shocks due to the slow-down in Latin America,
devaluation of the Brazilian Real and the initial weakness of the Euro against the
dollar.
If devaluation occurs, a floating exchange rate regime will be adopted. In this case,
following OS, it is assumed that the exchange rate acts so as to off-set external shocks.
Thus with the floating exchange rate s = xt/γ, the last two terms of (1) will cancel
out. To simplify the treatment, we assume further that (i) no revaluation is possible,
and (ii) devaluation will be accompanied by partial default as dollar debt is ‘pesified’,
i.e., converted to peso at devalued rate. With external shocks being stabilised by s
and all debts reduced and pesified, country risk will become zero. Hence output will
remain at full employment, i.e., y = 0. We are assuming that an FDR type of policy
would have deliver economic recovery.
To capture the experience of a country with high political instability, we introduce
the following sequence of events characterising the change of governments. Let the
first government be completely committed, and will never choose to devalue because
of the high costs it associates with devaluation. The fall of the first government is
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represented by a Poisson event with an arrival rate of λ per unit time. The probability
that the first government loses its power at time t follows an exponential distribution
with density function of λexp(−λt). The subsequent government has less commitment
to the peg because it has a smaller perceived cost of devaluation. If the external shock
is large, the new government will choose to devalue. Since the first government never
devalues, we only consider the devaluation decision under the new government.
Assume that the new government’s objective is to minimise expected squared
deviations of output from full employment, and that a cost of C(x) is incurred if the
government decides to devalue. To capture various different costs of devaluation, we
assume in particular that
C(x) = F + lx, (4)
where F indicates a fixed cost and the proportional part , lx, captures the case
where perceived costs may be state-dependent, indicating perhaps the difficulties of
reaching political consensus and legal agreement after the devaluation. If companies
borrow in dollars, this term can also capture the present value of losses of corporate
balance sheets due to devaluation.
Since the floating exchange rate regime is assumed to restore output to its full
employment level, the output losses after devaluation will be zero. Under these con-
ditions, the loss function of the new government is specified as
W (xt) = min
τ
Et{
∫ τ
t
y2(xs)e
−ρ(s−t)ds+ e−ρ(τ−t)C(xτ )}. (5)
where xt indicates initial shocks, τ the time for devaluation, ρ the new government’s
time preferences and Et the expectations operator conditional on time t.
In what follows, we first study the behaviour of interest rates (and so country
risk) and national output under the second government given the decision to leave
an exchange rate peg when external shocks reach a critical level of xE, known to
the markets. Then, there follows the ‘political economy analysis’ where the decision
to leave is made by optimising policy-makers who care about output stabilisation,
subject to a time consistency constraint. In all cases, we assume that the decision
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to abandon the fixed rate regime is irreversible and involves a cost specified in (4).
In section 4, we look at how anticipated devaluation and default under the second
government can generate country risk premium under the current ruling government
even if it is fully committed to the peg.
3 Devaluation and Default
3.1 Country Risk under Fully Anticipated Devaluation
Under the second government, devaluation occurs at a pre-determined external shock
trigger at xE, and after the collapse of the peg, one dollar of debt is converted into
one peso. Let η indicate the reduction in the par value of the debt in the event of
devaluation. At the trigger xE, devaluation is given by s(xE) = xE/γ, then the debt
is reduced to η(xE) = e
−s(xE) of its par value. If x > xE, the devaluation and debt
reduction are simply given by s(x) = x/γ and η(x) = e−x.
Let the average debt price v be a function of global fundamentals, xt. The arbi-
trage condition for v implies
Etdv(xt)
dt
+ c = rv(xt). (6)
Applying Ito’s lemma to (6) yields the following 2nd order ordinary differential equa-
tion
1
2
σ2v′′(x) + c = rv(x), (7)
which permits a general symmetric solution
v(x) = c/r + A1e
ζx + A2e
−ζx, (8)
where ζ =
√
2r/σ2 and A1 and A2 are constants to be determined.
Since devaluation is irreversible, a value matching condition is required for the
price of the debt at the devaluation trigger
v(xE) = η(xE)c/r. (9)
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As no revaluation is possible, debt value will approach its par as for favourable fun-
damentals, i.e. x→ −∞,
lim
x→−∞
v(x) = c/r. (10)
Applying (9) and (10) to (8) yields
v(x) =
 cr [1− (1− e−xE/γ)eζ(x−xE)], if x ≤ xE;c
r
e−x/γ, if x > xE.
(11)
The above equation shows that the devaluation trigger xE has two opposite effects
on the price of debt when x ≤ xE: the default effect represented by the term (1 −
e−xE/γ) and the discounting effect by eζ(x−xE). Given an initial x, higher xE leads to
larger devaluation and so larger reduction in debt value, but higher xE also implies
that it takes longer to reach this trigger resulting in a higher discounting of such
reduction.
Given devaluation and default occurring at xE, (11) and (25) determine the coun-
try risk under the peg:
pi(x) =
 cr (1− e−xE/γ)eζ(x−xE) for x ≤ xE;c
r
(1− e−x/γ) for x > xE.
(12)
From (11) and (1), the resulting output gap is given by
y(x) =
α cr (1− e−xE/γ)eζ(x−xE) + x, for x ≤ xE;0, for x > xE. (13)
When the devaluation (revaluation) trigger is given, the debt valuation function
derived above is shown as an inverted S-shape curve SS in Figure 1 where x is mea-
sured on the horizontal axis. As x falls below zero, the country risk premium increases
sharply. At the point of devaluation (and revaluation), value matching conditions ap-
ply. So, dollar bonds which are to be pesified at a rate of 2 pesos to the dollar on
devaluation, for example, will fall to half their par value as x approaches xE.
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Figure 2: Adverse fundamentals and the price discount
3.2 Time Consistent Devaluation and Default
The time consistent devaluation and default trigger under the second government is
determined as follows: given public expectations of devaluation and default at xE,
the government chooses its trigger xQ so as to minimise the losses of (5) subject to
the cost of abandoning the peg (4); then, the time consistent equilibrium is obtained
when xQ = xE is imposed.
For x ≤ xQ, the Feynman-Kac formula implies that the loss function W (x) in (5)
is a solution to the following ordinary differential equation
1
2
σ2W ′′(x) + y2(x) = ρW (x), (14)
9
which permits the general solution
W (x) =B1e
ξx +B2e
−ξx +
(aγ)2
ρ− 4r (1− e
−xE/γ)e2ζ(x−xE)
+
2aγ
ρ− r (1− e
−xE/γ)
(
x+
ζσ2
ρ− r
)
eζ(x−xE) +WN(x),
(15)
where a = αc/(rγ), ξ =
√
2ρ/σ2, B1 and B2 are two constants to be determined
(assuming ρ 6= r and ρ 6= 4r). In the absence of devaluation and default, country risk
disappears and the losses are simply given by WN(x) = x
2/ρ+ σ2/ρ2.
To determine B1 and B2, two things are worth noting: first, that no revaluation is
allowed (xQ ≥ 0), and second that the trigger xQ is optimally chosen. No revaluation
implies an asymptotic condition of
lim
x→−∞
W (x) = lim
x→−∞
WN(x). (16)
This requires B2 = 0. No revaluation also implies two distinct cases for the optimal
trigger xQ: either xQ has an interior solution of xQ > 0, or xQ = 0. In the case of
an interior solution, irreversibility of the decision to float and the optimality of the
trigger xQ imply the following value matching and smooth pasting conditions (Dixit
& Pindyck 1994)3:
W (xQ) = F + lxQ, (17)
W ′(xQ) = l. (18)
Eliminating B1 and imposing time consistency yield an equilibrium trigger xE as a
solution to the equation
φ(xE) ≡2aγ
σ2
(1− e−xE/γ)
[
aγ
ξ + 2ζ
(1− e−xE/γ) + 2xE
ξ + ζ
− 2
(ξ + ζ)2
]
+
ξx2E
ρ
− (ξl + 2/ρ)xE = K,
(19)
where K = ξ(F − σ2/ρ2) − l. In the case of no interior solution (so xQ = 0), one
imposes only (17).
The following propositions characterise the equilibrium triggers of devaluation and
default for differing parameter restrictions.
3Note that value matching and smooth pasting conditions are necessary but not sufficient for the
interior solution to be a Nash equilibrium. We show this formally in Appendix A.
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Proposition 1 Let K∗ = minx≥0 φ(x). If a+ ln a ≤ 5− ln 2 + 1/[γ(ξ + ζ)] then:
(1) for K < K∗, xE = 0;
(2) for K > K∗, there is unique time consistent devaluation and default trigger
xE > 0. This trigger has the comparative static property ∂xE/∂F > 0.
Proof: see Appendix A.
Given that external debt has a very long maturity (c/r close to 1), Proposition 1
characterizes cases where the effect of country risk on output can be up to at least
more than four times larger than that of the exchange rates. For cases where country
risk effect is even larger, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If ρl/2+1/ξ ≤ (a+ ln a+9/4+ ln 2)γ, time consistent triggers have
the same characterization as in Proposition 1.
Proof: see Appendix B.
Relaxing restriction imposed in Proposition 1, Proposition 2 suggests that the
uniqueness of the devaluation and default trigger can still be retained as long as the
proportional cost for floating the exchange rate is not excessive. Although parameter
restrictions imposed in both Propositions 1 and 2 are quite reasonable, they do require
that costs associated with devaluation and default are moderate. For the case of
extremely high costs, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 For cases other than those described in Propositions 1 and 2, there
may exist two time consistent devaluation and default triggers. Let K1 < K2 be the
two local minimum, and K3 be the local maximum of φ(xE), then
(1) for K < K1, xE = 0;
(2) for K2 < K < K3, there are two time consistent equilibria x
′
E < xE both
satisfying ∂xE/∂F > 0;
(3) for K > K3, there is a unique equilibrium xE with ∂xE/∂F > 0.
Proof: see Appendix C.
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Results in Proposition 3 very much resemble those in Obstfeld (1996). When the
cost of floating is small, devalue and default at a first possible instance. When the cost
of floating is large, normal option value implies a delayed devaluation and default.
Multiple equilibria occur when the cost is intermediate. In this case, expectations of
early floating reduce the option value of delay and result in actual early devaluation;
and similarly for expectations of late devaluation.
4 Country Risk Premium and Peso Problem
Note that the political instability and expectations of a subsequent new government
to devalue if output gap is sufficiently large may drive up country risk premium under
the current government. By taking as given the subsequent government’s decision to
devalue and default, we derive country risk under the current ‘tough’ government and
assess how political instability can impact on such premium.
Let t be the random time at which the current government is taken over by a
subsequent ‘weak’ government who will devalue. Following the assumptions made in
section 2, the current value of dollar debt is
u(x) = EλEZ{
∫ t
0
ce−rsds+ e−rtv(xt; xE)}, (20)
where v(xt;xE) is the value of debt under the new government (as in (11)), EZ is the
expectations operator over the Brownian motion and Eλ the expectations operator
over take-over random time t. The first term represents the discounted coupon pay-
ments under the current government, and the second the discounted debt value when
the new government takes over.
For an initial external shock of x(0) = x, (3) has a solution xt = x+σZt where Zt
is normally distributed with mean zero and variance t. Given t follows an exponential
distribution with density of λe−λt, we can rewrite (20) as
u(x) =
c
λ+ r
+ EλEZe
−rtv(x+ σZt;xE). (21)
The expected coupon payments under the current government are simply discounted
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by an effective rate which incorporates the probability that the current government
can fall. We relegate the computation of the second term in Appendix D.
Let Zˆ = (xE − x)/σ, one can show that the debt price is given by
u(x) =

c
r
[
1− λ
2(λ+r)
g1(xE)e
−
√
2(λ+r)Zˆ − (1− e−xE/γ)e−ζσZˆ
]
if Zˆ > 0,
c
r
[
r
λ+r
+ λ
2(λ+r)
g2(xE)e
√
2(λ+r)Zˆ + 4γ
2(λ+r)e−x/γ
2γ2(λ+r)−σ2
]
if Zˆ ≤ 0;
(22)
where g1(xE) = 1− (1− e−xE/γ)/(1− ζσ/
√
2(λ+ r))− e−xE/γ/[1 + σ/(γ√2(λ+ r))]
and g2(xE) = 1 − (1 − e−xE/γ)/(1 + ζσ/
√
2(λ+ r)) − e−xE/γ/[1 − σ/(γ√2(λ+ r))].
The resulting country risk (price discount) is
pi′(x) =

c
r
[
λ
2(λ+r)
g1(xE)e
−
√
2(λ+r)Zˆ + (1− e−xE/γ)e−ζσZˆ
]
if Zˆ > 0,
λ
λ+r
c
r
[
1− 1
2
g2(xE)e
√
2(λ+r)Zˆ − 4γ2(λ+r)e−x/γ
2γ2(λ+r)−σ2
]
if Zˆ ≤ 0;
(23)
where the first row represents country risk if the current fundamental is below the
trigger of the second government, otherwise the country risk is given by the second.
With no political instability (λ = 0), (22) shows that debt price is at par (c/r),
and (23) gives country risk premium of zero. The presence of political instability
reduces the price and increases country risk. When the change of the government is
immediate (λ→∞), country risk under the the first government is identical to that
of the second (as (22) degenerates to (11) and (23) becomes (12)).
Figure 3 illustrates how country risk under the first government is determined
(the horizontal axis is the fundamental while the vertical is the country risk). Dashed
curve SS represents country risk under the second government (it is also the one for
the first government if λ → ∞). The horizontal axis gives the country risk for the
first government if λ = 0. For any given λ > 0, country risk for the first government
is simply a weighted average of SS and the horizontal axis (where the weight is state
dependent). Two possible country risk profiles for the first government are drawn:
SS corresponds to λ = λH and LL to λ = λL < λH .
Can this model explain the country risk premium in Argentina before the collapse
of the Convertibility regime? As can be seen in Figure 1, country risk was about
10% before mid-2001, rose to 15% in the third quarter, and then jumped to 40%
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Figure 3: Political instability and the peso problem
in the fourth quarter, when the country was widely believed to be in the throes of
a “slow motion train crash”. Figure 3 represents the relatively low country risk of
10% by point A which corresponds to low political risk. Deteriorating fundamentals
could account for the gradual increase of country risk, as indicated by the movement
from A to B (where it is assumed that the fundamental at B has passed the trigger
for devaluation and default of the second government, labeled XE). It is clear that,
towards the end of 2001, the market revised upwards the exit probability of de la
Rua regime. Interpreting this as an increase in the parameter λ, this will shift the
price-discount schedule up from LL to HH and correspond to the rapid increase in
country risk before the fall of the de la Rua government.
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5 Conclusions
Market expectations of a change of government can undermine the effectiveness of
the most committed policy-maker: and sovereign spreads can rise even when a cur-
rency board is fully supported by the current administration. This paper provides an
explicit pricing of such risk when political instability is given exogenously. But there
are other political economy considerations not explored here, factors that may help
to account for why crisis not recovery followed upon transition. The Argentine case,
in particular, shows that there are distorted incentives for policy when devaluation
looms: and, partly as a consequence, political transition may itself prove chaotic.
The temptation to ‘gamble for resurrection’ for policy-makers facing devaluation
was noted in this particular case by Kenneth Rogoff, (Blustein 2005, p.142). Defend-
ing the parity in the face of capital flight by borrowing large amounts of dollars from
the IMF- dollars that that would have to repaid in full after any devaluation - makes
sense if one takes account only of the payoff if the strategy works - ignoring all other
payoffs because dismissal is the price of failure. (It is interesting to contrast this
policy of reckless borrowing with that adopted by President Roosevelt in the early
1930s: facing the prospect of leaving the gold standard, he imposed strict controls
over gold holdings, banning all private holdings, and cancelled the gold-clause on all
debt contracts (Kroszner 2003). Another telling example of these incentives at work
was the “megaswap” of government debt arranged in mid-2001 by the team led by
Cavallo. Michel Mussa’s staff in the research department of the IMF calculated that
it would “... save $12 billion in debt payments from 2001 to 2005 while adding $66
billion in payments from 2006 to 2030...” (Blustein 2005, p.129).
The confused nature of the transfer of power in the Argentine case is underlined
by the fact that there were “5 presidents in 10 days”: and that President Duhalde was
only regarded as a care-taker, precluded from running for office when the next round
of elections were held in 2003 (Bruno 2004). Lack of political legitimacy, coming
after capital flight had stripped off central bank of its dollar reserves, could help to
explain the chaotic end to convertibility. These could prove interesting extensions to
the political economy approach adopted here.
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Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 1
We show first that the function φ(xE) is strictly convex under the given assumptions.
Using the fact that φ is initially strictly decreasing and then increasing, we establish
interior time consistent solutions and their comparative static properties. Finally, we
show that xE = 0 if the devaluation and default cost is relatively low. For a simple
exposition, we drop the subscript of x.
For φ′′(x) > 0, it is equivalent to have
ϕ(x) ≡ σ
2ex/γ
4a
φ′′(x) =
2ae−x/γ
ξ + 2ζ
+
ex/γ
aξ
− x
γ(ξ + ζ)
+
1
γ(ξ + ζ)2
+
2
ξ + ζ
> 0. (24)
Function ϕ(x) is strictly convex and has a unique minimum at
x∗ = −γ ln(a∗/a), where a∗ = ξ + 2ζ
4(ξ + ζ)
(√
1 +
8(ξ + ζ)2
ξ(ξ + 2ζ)
− 1
)
. (25)
If a ≤ a∗, φ(x) is strictly convex. This is because x∗ ≤ 0, and ϕ(x) is strictly
increasing for x ≥ 0. Since ϕ(0) > 0, so ϕ(x) > 0 for x ≥ 0.
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If a > a∗, x∗ > 0. Strict convexity of φ(x) now requires ϕ(x∗) ≥ 0. This translates
into the following parameter restriction
ln a+
ξ + ζ
ξ + 2ζ
a ≤ ln a∗ + 4(ξ + ζ)
ξ + 2ζ
a∗ + 3 +
1
γ(ξ + ζ)
. (26)
The first two terms on the RHS of (26) are decreasing in ξ and have a minimum of
2− ln 2 when ξ →∞. So ln a+ a ≤ 5− ln 2 + 1/[γ(ξ + ζ)] is sufficient for (26).
Since φ(x) is strictly convex, with φ′(0) < 0 and φ′(+∞) > 0, φ(x) must have a
unique minimum K∗ = φ(x¯) and x¯ > 0. So φ′(x) < 0 for x ∈ [0, x¯), and φ′(x) > 0 for
x > x¯.
For K∗ < K < 0, as φ(0) = 0 and φ(+∞) → +∞, there must be two solutions:
0 < x
′
E < x¯ and xE > x¯. We show that x
′
E is not a Nash equilibrium while xE is. Note
that from loss function given in (15), a minimum of W is equivalent to a minimum
of B1 (as B2 = 0). Using (17) to solve for B1 yields
B1 =e
−ξxQ
[
F + lxQ − (aγ)
2
ρ− 4r (1− e
−xE/γ)2e2ζ(xQ−xE)
− 2aγ
ρ− r (1− e
−xE/γ)eζ(xQ−xE)
(
xQ +
ζσ2
ρ− r
)
− x
2
Q
ρ
− σ
2
ρ2
]
.
(27)
Differentiating B1 with respect to xQ and imposing the time consistency xQ = xE
gives
∂B1
∂xQ
∣∣∣∣
xQ=xE
= e−ξxE [φ(xE)−K], (28)
where at x
′
E, φ(x
′
E)−K = 0. The strict convexity of φ(x) implies φ′(x′E) < 0. Consider
a small reduction of xQ from x
′
E (while by still imposing time consistency), this leads
to an increase in B1 and so the loss function. Thus x
′
E is not a Nash equilibrium.
Using this similar local argument, one can show that xE is a Nash equilibrium.
To establish the comparative static property of xE, note that φ(x) is locally in-
creasing at xE, so ∂xE/∂F > 0.
For K > 0, there is only one solution xE satisfying φ(xE) −K = 0. As φ(xE) is
locally increasing, so xE is a Nash equilibrium. Similarly, we also have ∂xE/∂F > 0.
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If K < K∗, there is no interior solution. In this case, only (17) can be imposed
as a boundary condition. This results B1 as in (27) and its derivative with respect to
the trigger as in (28). For K < K∗ and any xE > 0, ∂B1/∂xQ|xQ=xE > 0, so xE = 0.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Here we only need to show that φ(x) is initially decreasing and then increasing for
x ≥ 0 under the given parameter restriction. The rest of the proof follows directly
from Appendix A.
Let
ψ(x) ≡ σ
2ex/γ
4a
φ′(x) =
aγ
ξ + 2ζ
(1−e−x/γ)+ x− xˆ
aξ
ex/γ+
x
ξ + ζ
− 1
(ξ + ζ)2
− γ
ξ + ζ
(29)
where xˆ = ρl/2 + 1/ξ − aγξ/(ξ + ζ). Differentiating ψ yields
δ(x) ≡ e−x/γψ′(x) = ae
−2x/γ
ξ + 2ζ
+
e−x/γ
ξ + ζ
+
x− xˆ+ γ
aγξ
(30)
So ψ(x) is strictly increasing as long as δ(x) > 0 for x ≥ 0.
Function δ(x) is strictly convex and has a unique stationary point at x∗ (as defined
in Appendix A), so δ(x∗) is the minimum. If a ≥ a∗, x∗ > 0. Positive δ(x) requires
δ(x∗) > 0, which in turn imposes the following parameter restriction
1
2
ρl +
1
ξ
≤
[
ξa
ξ + ζ
+ ln a+
ξ
2(ξ + ζ)
a∗ − ln a∗ + 2
]
γ ≤ (a+ ln a+ 9/4 + ln 2)γ (31)
So given (31), ψ(x) is strictly increasing in x for x ≥ 0. As ψ(0) < 0 and ψ(+∞) > 0,
ψ(x) = 0 has a unique solution x¯, and φ′(x) > 0 for x ∈ [0, x¯), φ′(x) < 0 for x > x¯.
C Proof of Proposition 3
It is obvious from (24) that, for x ≥ 0, φ(x) is initially convex, then concave, and
finally convex. At most φ(x) can have two local minima K1 < K2 and one local
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maximum K3. For K2 < K < K3, φ(x) −K = 0 has four zeros: two of which occur
when φ′(x) < 0 (so ruled out for Nash equilibria) and the other two with φ′(x) > 0 (so
they constitute Nash equilibria). The rest of the proof follows exactly as in Appendix
A.
D Country Risk Premium under the First Gov-
ernment
Denote the second term in (22) by I, then
I ≡ EλEZe−rtv(x+ σZt;xE)
=
∫ ∞
0
λe−λt
[∫ +∞
−∞
1√
2pit
e−s
2/(2t)−rtv(x+ σs; xE)ds
]
dt
=
2λ√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
v(x+ σs;xE)
[∫ ∞
0
e−(λ+r)(
√
t)2−(1/2)s2/(√t)2d
√
t
]
ds
(32)
Using the formula∫ ∞
0
e−ax
2−b/x2dx =
1
2
√
pi
a
e−2
√
ab, for a > 0 and b > 0
(Gradshteyn and Ryzhik, 1994, p355, 3.325), (32) becomes
I =
λ√
2(λ+ r)
∫ +∞
−∞
v(x+ σs;xE)e
−
√
2(λ+r)|s|ds
=
λ√
2(λ+ r)
c
r
{∫ Zˆ
−∞
[
1− (1− e−xE/γ)eζ(x+σs−xE)] e−√2(λ+r)|s|ds
+
∫ +∞
Zˆ
e−(x+σs)/γe−
√
2(λ+r)|s|ds
} (33)
Some straightforward integrations for different cases of Zˆ yield (22) in the text.
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